Research

When, how, and to what ends do opposition parties look beyond their borders for support? In an increasingly authoritarian global environment, oppositions face acute barriers to gaining power and promoting fair elections. International actors, such as foreign governments, diaspora communities, and transnational activists, all present opposition parties with potential resources, from financial and rhetorical backing to political and economic leverage. But engaging foreign actors also comes with risks: doing so can eat up limited resources and can leave oppositions open to being tagged and punished as “tools of foreign interference.” Amidst these considerations, pro- democracy parties have diverged in the extent to which they deliberately internationalize their struggles, and these choices have implications not only for their prospects at home, but also for relations between the governments they engage and challenge.

The book project considers various forms of international engagement by opposition politicians and develops and tests a theory of when parties pursue them and to what ends. I focus, in particular, on a set of activities aimed at encouraging international pressure on incumbent regimes, which I refer to collectively as “opposition diplomacy.” These include networking through transnational political party organizations and enlisting diaspora supporters to lobby foreign governments on their behalf. Relying on original cross-national data on the international activities of opposition parties, as well as case studies based on in-depth, interview-based fieldwork in Southeast Asia, Europe, and the United States, I demonstrate that opposition parties and politicians engage in opposition diplomacy when pathways to power are constrained at home, and that these activities can influence decisions by Western policymakers, particularly when oppositions can successfully convince those policymakers that they are both viable electoral contenders and credibly committed to democratic norms.

While prior accounts of transnational advocacy situate NGOs or diaspora communities as protagonists, I demonstrate how engagement by opposition politicians is often central to the activation of these other actors and constituencies toward pro-democratic ends. In doing so, I aim to reshape how we think about strategic interactions not only between opposition parties and incumbent regimes, but also between diasporas and homeland politics, donor and recipient governments, and various other actors operating beyond state borders.

Opposition coalitions under electoral authoritarianism have been associated with greater likelihood of opposition victory and democratization. I argue, however, that coalitions also entail significant downside risks with implications for longer-term prospects for democracy. Where coalitions produce strong electoral outcomes but fail to force turnovers, regimes are left with both the incentive and capacity to repress and reconsolidate power. I show cross-nationally that opposition coalitions are associated with stronger opposition performance overall, but that when oppositions fail to take power, exceptionally strong performance is associated with greater autocratization in the subsequent years, including increased repression and poorer electoral quality in future contests. Probing the case of Cambodia, I demonstrate how the very features that make opposition coalitions a useful tool in strengthening performance also invite new threats from regimes. I argue that this makes coalition formation a particularly risky proposition.

Supplementary appendix available here.

Are social media users in developing and conflict-affected countries more intolerant than non-users? As platforms like Facebook become increasingly viewed as drivers of polarization and violence, this question is critical to understanding social media’s potential role in stoking and perpetuating intergroup conflict. We explore this question using unique survey data that istinguishes between Facebook users and non-users in a conflict-affected, yet understudied context. Myanmar has been cited as a cautionary example of social media’s toxic environment and deleterious effects. But arguments that highlight Facebook’s connections to malicious actors or instances of localized violence often implicitly assume a disproportionately toxic online community with the capacity to negatively influence intergroup attitudes. Challenging this assumption, we find that Facebook users are significantly more tolerant of other religions and ethnicities on average than non-users, even controlling for relevant demographic covariates. We suggest that these findings are largely the product of selection and that Facebook’s power to dramatically reshape public attitudes may be relatively limited. We argue that the findings should influence how we evaluate claims about Facebook’s contribution to high levels of ethnic and religious intolerance in Myanmar and other diverse societies.

After many decades and billions of dollars spent, the effects of foreign democracy promotion interventions remain poorly understood, particularly in authoritarian contexts. Do these external interventions contribute to the building blocks of democratization and democratic consolidation under autocracy? Do these potential contributions come at the cost of bolstering autocrats’ credibility? This article presents a randomized study of a democracy promotion program undertaken by a prominent international non-governmental organization (INGO) in rural Cambodia, in which elected parliamentarians from multiple political parties interacted with constituents. The intervention had relatively large effects on individuals’ knowledge about politics and self-reported political engagement but, crucially, did not give citizens increased confidence in Cambodia’s “democracy,” suggesting a role for democracy promotion without whitewashing the authoritarian nature of Cambodian politics. Overall, the results suggest that democracy promotion under authoritarianism can foster a more engaged and informed citizenry without lending undue credibility to an authoritarian system.

Western democratic powers are no longer the dominant external shapers of political transitions around the world. A new global marketplace of political change now exists, in which varied arrays of states, including numerous nondemocracies and non-Western democracies, are influencing transitional trajectories. Western policymakers and aid practitioners have been slow to come to grips with the realities and implications of this new situation.

Why do Western governments sanction some states for their violations of human rights and democratic norms but not others? I argue that an overlooked factor in the imposition of these “democratic sanctions” is the character and actions of opposition parties from potential target states. Sanctions have been found to bolster opposition resolve and spur anti-regime activity, but opposition actors themselves can also be instrumental in shaping where they are imposed in the first place. I argue that a robust, independent opposition can increase the likelihood of democratic sanctions by generating focal points for international advocacy, shaping perceptions of domestic political dynamics among Western policymakers, and limiting target regimes’ maneuverability by increasing the perceived costs associated with democratization. The domestic presence of an autonomous opposition drives this relationship, but parties can also amplify these dynamics by engaging in active transnational efforts to encourage pressure—what I term opposition diplomacy. Using cross-national data, I demonstrate that, among autocracies, regimes with autonomous opposition parties are more likely to be subjected to democratic sanctions. I use process tracing to explore the nature of this relationship in the context of the EU’s withdrawal of trade privileges from Myanmar in 1997. The findings highlight the important transnational role of domestic opposition parties, while shedding greater light on the dynamics of sanctions decision-making.

Manuscript available upon request

Nonpartisan citizen election observation plays an important role in promoting the credibility of electoral processes around the world. This article assesses whether nonpartisan observation can shape attitudes among the U.S. public, employing a series of survey experiments fielded to nearly 10,000 respondents that randomized a series of nonpartisan domestic observer treatments. These included both hypothetical vignettes and information about a real-world nonpartisan domestic observation mission undertaken during the 2022 midterm elections in Fulton County, GA by the Carter Center—the first of its kind in the United States. We show that positive assessments by nonpartisan observers of the hypothetical and Fulton County elections increased respondents’ confidence in electoral results and processes, and also made respondents more likely to identify the officially announced winner over the candidate they favored as the candidate who won. Alternative ways of framing observers were largely inconsequential.

Manuscript available here

Theories of democratization by elections suggest that, even if they fail to win, strong opposition challenges in electoral authoritarian regimes have the potential to contribute to democratization over time. But such challenges also represent threats to the autocratic status quo, which could incentivize repression. As a result, I argue that there are significant risks associated with failed moves to advance democracy via electoral competition, and that human rights may wind up a casualty in these contexts. Combining existing cross-national indicators with original data on opposition performance in electoral autocracies, I show that strong but unsuccessful opposition challenges are associated with both subsequent democratic backsliding and decreases in respect for human rights. Such backlash often produces long-term harm to prospects for democratization, but if oppositions can withstand the onslaught, then they may be able to capitalize on the benefits that strong performance entails, including a more motivated support base. Comparing elections in Cambodia and Malaysia, I further explore qualitatively the conditions under which oppositions are able to endure repression and continue to push for democracy. I argue that their ability to do so is contingent on structural conditions unknowable to opposition parties in advance, complicating their pathway toward building on electoral gains over time.

Manuscript available upon request